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that high-frequency trading is making the
equity markets more volatile. While it is true
that the speed of trading has advanced enor-
mously in the last several years, it is far too
simplistic to blame technology for market
volatility. In fact, academic research has
shown that high-frequency trading has a
dampening effect on volatility. 
First of all, just to be clear, high-frequency
trading is a method for executing trades. It
can be used for a variety of different trading
strategies, but it is not a strategy in itself. It
is simply the latest phase in the evolution of
electronic trading technology, much as the
smart phone is the latest iteration of the per-
sonal communication device. 
So why do members of FIA EPTA use high-
frequency trading? The reason is simple –
this method of trading makes it possible for
high-frequency traders to provide liquidity to
the exchange-traded markets more efficiently.
Every price quote that high-frequency
traders provide to an exchange creates a risk
exposure. For any given quote, the value of
this exposure is very low, but across an entire
market the exposure can be significant, so
high-frequency traders have to be very nim-
ble in adjusting their quotes. In those mar-
kets where exchange speeds are very high
and the latency of trading is very low, firms
can manage their risk more effectively. And
that allows high-frequency traders to quote
narrower spreads for larger size and fill rest-
ing orders more frequently. This improves
liquidity and reduces costs for end users. 
There is a widely held view that restricting
high-frequency trading will somehow reduce
volatility. Nothing could be farther from the
truth. As liquidity providers, high-frequency
traders buffer the exchange-traded markets
from external shocks. Without their partici-
pation, the screens will go dark and prices
will go to extremes. Putting “sand in the
gears” would reduce the ability to provide 
liquidity and make the markets more sus-
ceptible to volatility, not less. 
This is borne out by research done by aca-
demics who have carefully analyzed data
from a number of exchange-traded markets
around the world. Their findings are consis-
tent: volatility is dampened, not increased, by
high-frequency trading. A sample of this
research is available on the FIA EPTA website
at http://www.futuresindustry.org/epta/acade-
mic-research.asp
It is often claimed that the increasing use of
high-frequency trading is damaging investor
confidence and making investors more reluc-
tant to trade. This criticism seems mis-
placed. The reasons for investor uncertainty
are all around us – the grave fiscal problems
facing several European countries, the once-
unthinkable downgrade of the U.S. credit rat-
ing, the potential for another round of huge
losses in the banking system, and the grow-
ing fear that the tools of monetary policy
have reached their limit in preventing a glob-
al recession, to name just a few. 
In any case, sentiment alone should not be
the basis for policy decisions. Regulators
must arm themselves with empirical data to
help them distinguish perception from reali-
ty. And to the best of our knowledge, all the
empirical data show that high-frequency
trading has improved the quality of
exchange-traded markets to the benefit of all
investors.
This view is also supported by Blackrock, a
leading asset management firm. In a paper
published in June 2011, Blackrock said high-
frequency trading has a beneficial effect on
European equity markets. “HFT helps to cre-
ate efficient markets by facilitating price for-
mation, lowering the cost of trading and
improving the linkage between markets,”
Blackrock said. “All of this, in turn, aids in
achieving optimal investment performance
for end investors.”
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Editorial
High-Frequency Trading: 
Myths and Realities
Mark Spanbroek
Mark Spanbroek
Vice Chairman
FIA European Principal Traders Association 
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With its information-driven business processes,
continuously changing customer demands, and
above-average volatility, the financial industry
critically relies on an efficient exchange of infor-
mation. However, as work becomes more global,
distributed and non-collocated, it also becomes
more difficult for workers to stay aware of all rel-
evant information in their business environment
(Gutwin and Greenberg, 2002). Specifically when
collaborating with others, individuals often lack
what has been labeled situation awareness (SA).
In short, SA is defined as an individual’s knowl-
edge about what is going on in its immediate
environment. With respect to collaborative work,
individuals need to know, e.g., about their col-
leagues emotional state or whom to ask about
the solution for an issue which needs to be
solved. While in traditional work settings, SA is
gained in face-to-face communication, informa-
tion systems (IS) are needed to create and main-
tain SA between people working apart from each
other. In this regard, social collaboration plat-
forms such as Enterprise Microblogging (EMB)
are suggested to be a promising solution to solve
this challenge.
Originally rooted in social psychology, SA is the
result of exchanging and processing environ-
mental information in order to develop a mental
picture of the situation as guidance for further
action. Based on this definition, two separate
types of SA can be distinguished from a collabo-
ration point of view: Team situation awareness,
which is defined as the aggregation of the indi-
vidual SA across all collaborators, and shared
situation awareness, i.e. the individual’s SA with
respect to the activities of its co-workers.
Within IS research, the focus has been largely on
how to support SA from a rather technical point
of view. Due to this predominant technical orien-
tation, attention has shifted away from the origi-
nal concept of SA as a cognitive process. As a
result, the concept lacks the clear theoretical
understanding needed to support SA with IS
effectively.
Accordingly, we develop a general conceptual
model to enhance our understanding of SA in
distributed collaboration and to provide guidance
for the design and evaluation of IS that support
the creation of SA. Further, we demonstrate how
the model may be utilized by evaluating an exist-
ing social collaboration platform regarding its
ability to support the creation of SA. Specifically,
we conduct a content analysis on a rich dataset of
EMB data from a financial services provider.
Development of the Conceptual Model
Since SA is inherently based on information, IS
are needed to provide individuals with specific
awareness information about their environment.
However, and with respect to distributed collabo-
ration in particular, it is not clear which specific
kind of information IS should provide to support
SA. Therefore, we conducted a systematic review
of the literature in order to determine categories
of awareness information being needed.
The first identified category, activity awareness
(AC), includes all SA subtypes relating to activi-
ties needed to achieve a common goal. Structure
awareness (ST), which we define as an aggrega-
tion of all subtypes of SA related to knowledge
about informal and formal structures at work, is
specified as the second category. The third cate-
gory includes all subtypes of SA relating to social
interaction between collaborating individuals and
is labeled social awareness (SO). Finally, we con-
ceptualize context awareness as an aggregation
of all subtypes emerging from the 3 categories of
SA over time. Since information holds little value
without context this category provides individuals
with a general sense of the context in which
things are happening.
Research Report
Situation Awareness in Financial Service
Institutions through Social Collaboration
Platforms 
THE INCREASING ABSENCE OF FACE-TO-FACE COMMUNICATION IS A CHALLENGE FOR 
EMPLOYEES AND ENTERPRISES IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN SITUATION AWARENESS.
Christoph Seebach Roman Beck
Immanuel Pahlke
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Figure 1: A conceptual model of SA in Distributed Collaboration
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trates the relations between these elements
based on the initial definition of SA. Accordingly,
the model’s structure is based on four steps:
1) information extraction, 2) information integra-
tion, and based upon, 3) development of a mental
picture, to guide 4) further action. The informa-
tion extraction step describes the ability of an
individual to extract emerging activity, social or
structure awareness information in a timely
manner. In the information integration step, the
individual needs to integrate this new awareness
information in its specific context in order to
make sense out of it. Finally, SA emerges as a
mental picture of the situation and may then pro-
vide guidance regarding an individual’s further
actions. From a distributed collaboration view,
this may lead to more effective interaction
between collaborating individuals.
Empirical Results
To demonstrate how the conceptual model
might be utilized, we evaluate a social collabo-
ration platform regarding its ability to support
SA. Specifically, we analyze the content of a
huge dataset of EMB messages obtained from
a bank’s system to measure to what extent the
system provides awareness information to its
users. For this purpose, we developed a coding
scheme which operationalizes each of the
three awareness information categories and
their specific facets given in the table below. 
The results of our analysis show that the mes-
sages exchanged via the EMB platform are a
rich source of awareness information. 72% of
the analyzed posts contain at least one of the
three categories of awareness information.
Specifically, more than 50% of the messages
support users with social awareness informa-
tion (SO) about their colleagues. However, with
a share of more than 30% for structural (ST)
and 22% for activity (AC) awareness informa-
tion, the other two types are well represented
in the messages, too. As Figure 2 illustrates,
AC3, SO2, SO4 and ST2 occur with highest fre-
quency among all 11 facets of awareness infor-
mation. At a level of more than 10%, the tool
was utilized for exchanging information about
what employees needed from each other (AC3)
to do their work. Information about the emo-
tional state of the users (SO2) is represented by
approximately 10%. Almost every third mes-
sage contains information about the positions
and opinions of the users (ST2). With an aver-
age frequency of 46%, the system supports its
users with information about who talks to
whom (SO4). 
Conclusion
The conceptual model developed explains how
SA emerges from the extraction and process-
ing of awareness information and illustrates
the important role of IS as bridging the gap
between geographically distributed workers.
Further, we developed a broad categorization
of different subtypes of SA and derived cate-
gories and facets of awareness information
needed to maintain them.
From a practical view, our conceptualization
of awareness information might help to form
the basis for a rigorous specification and 
evaluation technique of IS designed to support
SA. Further, practitioners may want to assess
to what extent existing systems already sup-
port SA. Moreover, our conceptualization
could be helpful to determine guidelines for
the design of new collaboration platforms and
their evaluation. 
Finally, our work contributes to the few stud-
ies on social collaboration platforms, and
their usefulness and value for business. 
Our analysis of the bank’s system illustrates
how EMB supports the creation and mainte-
nance of SA within financial service institu-
tions as an important dynamic capability to
meet the challenges of turbulent environ-
ments. Since SA is an important prerequisite
for successful collaboration, we thus con-
clude that EMB can play a crucial role to 
generate business value from improved SA
among employees.
References
Gutwin, C.; Greenberg, S.:  
A Descriptive Framework of Workspace Awa  re  -
ness for Real-Time Groupware.
In: Computer Supported Cooperative Work, 11
(2002) 3, pp. 411-446.
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Figure 2: Freq. of Awareness Information Categories and Facets per Message over Time (weekly)
Facet AC1 AC2 AC3 AC4 AC5 SO1 SO2 SO3 SO4 ST1 ST2
Mean 5.46% 5.36% 12.69% 4.23% 1.85% 4.13% 10.47% 4.13% 46.82% 4.38% 27.68%
SD 2.05% 1.60% 2.45% 1.96% 0.70% 1.21% 2.10% 1.89% 4.45% 1.32% 4.98%
Cat. Activity Social Structural
Mean 22.91 % 53.87% 30.97%
14 weeks
0
20%
20%
30%
40%
Freq.
Category Facet
AC1: What are others currently doing?
AC2: What intend others to do in the
future?
AC3: What need others from me?
AC4: How have activities to be done?
AC5: What is the purpose or goal of an
activity?
Activity 
awareness
SO1: Who is interested in a specific
issue?
SO2: What is the emotional state of
others?
SO3: Who is busy or available?
SO4: Who is talking to whom?
Structure
awareness
ST1: Who is a contact person for what?
ST2: Who has which positions 
regarding an issue?
Social 
awareness 
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Using data from a field study, we are among
the first to examine the demand side of finan-
cial advice and to show that an offer of free
and unbiased financial advice is accepted by
only 5% of the clients approached. Of those
clients who accept the offer, only very few ulti-
mately follow the recommendations made.
Thereby, the study contributes to the current
discussion on consumer protection in the
context of financial advice and questions the
effectiveness of supply side solutions, since
better information alone does not seem to
improve the decision making of private
investors.
There is a large and growing body of literature
on household finance, which documents that
retail investors make serious investment mis-
takes by deviating from the prescriptions of
normative finance. The majority of households
do not even participate in the stock market
despite the large equity premium that exists.
The few households that do participate in equi-
ty markets hold under-diversified portfolios.
Under-diversification with regard to geograph-
ical diversification is particularly pronounced –
investors are found to exhibit both a home bias
and a preference for local stocks (for a sum-
mary of investment mistakes, please refer to
Campbell, 2006).
Other investment mistakes in the trading
behavior of private investors have also been
documented. We observe inertia, resulting in
insufficient portfolio adjustments of individ-
ual investors to general market movements.
Investors trade too much because they are
overconfident. Investors tend to sell winners
too early and hold on to losers too long, an
investment mistake called the disposition
effect.  
Are these investment mistakes serious? Bar  ber
and Odean (2000), by looking at the con  -
sequences of overconfidence, find that over-
confidence leads to substantial return
decreases after the deduction of transaction
cost due to excessive trading. The more peo-
ple trade, the worse their net returns are. 
For the aggregate portfolio of individual
Taiwanese investors, Barber et al. (2009)
document an annualized loss of 3.8%. They
find individual investors to be even the worst
performing group of all investors in the
Taiwanese market.
Good Financial Advice – 
Wanted but not followed
THIS STUDY INVESTIGATES WHAT HAPPENS WHEN RETAIL CUSTOMERS ARE OFFERED
FREE AND UNBIASED ADVICE. USING A LARGE FIELD EXPERIMENT IT SHOWS THAT
THOSE WHO ACCEPT THE OFFER (5%) ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE MALE, OLDER, WEALTHIER,
MORE EXPERIENCED AND MORE FINANCIALLY SOPHISTICATED. HOWEVER, EVEN
THOUGH THE ADVICE WOULD HAVE HELPED, IT ACTUALLY LARGELY FAILED TO HELP
BECAUSE THE CUSTOMERS DID NOT LISTEN TO IT. OVERALL, OUR RESULTS SUGGEST
THAT THE MERE AVAILABILITY OF UNBIASED FINANCIAL ADVICE IS A NECESSARY 
BUT NOT SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR BENEFITING RETAIL CUSTOMERS. 
Utpal Bhattacharya Andreas Hackethal
Simon Kaesler Benjamin Loos
Steffen Meyer 
Research Report
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points out that next to financial education,
default options or regulation are potential
remedies for private household’s investment
mistakes. Yet, another potential remedy for
private households’ investment mistakes is
financial advice. Thereby, the business of pro-
viding financial advice is large all over the
world. For example, in the U.S., the Financial
Planning and Advice Industry is estimated to
equal a size of 37 billion dollars. The
Investment Company Institute also remarks
that over 80% of respondents state that they
use financial advice from professional advi-
sors. The same holds true for Germany. A
survey among retail investors indicates that
more than 80% of investors consult a financial
advisor before making investment decisions.
If you build it, they will come  
However, the literature also shows that the
professional advice given to retail investors is
often conflicted and that retail investors who
obtain such advice actually worsen their
investment performance, because advisors
may have incentives to increase primarily
their commissions instead of recommending
good products for the client (for example,
Inderst and Ottaviani, 2009). An obvious sup-
ply side cure to improve portfolio efficiency
and mitigate the investment mistakes of
retail investors is therefore to offer unbiased
and theoretically sound financial advice that
brings advisees closer to efficient portfolios.
If the abovementioned conflict is resolved,
advice may help improve investors’ perform-
ance. In other words, it could be expected
that expressed in colloquial terms: “If you
build it, they will come”.
The Field Experiment
We test whether this supply side solution
works. Can unbiased financial advice steer
retail investors towards efficient portfolios? To
answer this question, we work with one of the
largest brokerages in Europe, which has sev-
eral hundred thousand active retail cus-
tomers. This brokerage started offering finan-
cial advice to about 8,000 of its customers, all
of whom were chosen randomly, in 2009. The
clients were contacted via an e-mail to the
personal mailbox within their brokerage
account. If the customers did not react to the
e-mail, they were called and asked whether
they wanted to accept the offer.
The advice was free of charge for a limited
period of time and, ex-ante, unbiased as it
was generated from a commercial portfolio
optimizer that improves portfolio efficiency
and did not push specific products with high
commissions. It was even free of commis-
sions for the period of this field study and ter-
minated automatically. This advice was also
sound, because it substantially improved
diversification. For example, the share of
well-diversified index funds in the portfolios
sharply increased and the home bias, i.e., the
tendency to excessively hold German stocks,
was also reduced. In order to illustrate this
point: The share of German stocks amounted
to 52 % in the original portfolio of investors
and would have been reduced to 31 % if the
recommendation would have been imple-
mented. Diversification across asset classes
was improved as well. All this left customers
with a significantly more efficient portfolio
than they had before. This rests on the
assumption that they fully implemented the
recommendations. 
Due to the fact that we have data on all the
retail customers in our sample, i.e., for those
who accepted the advice and also for those
who did not accept the advice, including
administrative for the time before the advice
was offered and for up to ten months there-
after, we can answer some key questions
using a difference-in-difference methodology:
How many and which types of customers
accept the offer? If customers accept the
offer, is the advice provided followed? Does
portfolio efficiency improve for the average
advisee who accepts the offer? Does portfolio
efficiency improve for the average advisee
who follows the advice given? Are those
investors most in need of financial advice also
the ones most likely to get it?
The Findings
By answering these questions, we explore the
demand side of financial advice. We link the
recommendations of advisors with actual cus-
tomer behavior after the advice has been
given. First, we find that only about 5% of
clients accept the offer for free and unbiased
advice. These clients are more likely male, are
older, have more money, possess a higher
level of financial sophistication, and are also
more likely to have a longer relationship with
the brokerage.
Second, when regarding those who accept the
offer, the advice given is hardly followed. The
majority of investors do not follow the recom-
mendations at all. More than one third of the
investors act even against the advice by buy-
ing securities that were not recommended
and selling securities that they were advised
to keep (see Figure 1). Third, portfolio effi-
ciency improves for the average advisee who
follows the advice. But it would have improved
even more for those investors who accepted
the general offer, but did not subsequently
follow the recommendations made. Portfolio
performance improves most for the least
financially sophisticated investors. Thus, we
document that this unbiased financial advice
can indeed help investors improve their port-
folio performance, but it can only work if peo-
ple follow the recommendations.
Fourth, it seems that those investors most in
need of financial advice are the ones least
likely to get it and vice versa. The ones who
experienced the worst performance in the
past and could benefit much more from the
advice are less likely to accept the offer. In
other words, to speak colloquially ”the sick do
not go to the doctor”. 
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availability of unbiased and theoretically
sound financial advice is a necessary but not
a sufficient condition for benefiting retail
customers. Thus, as the saying goes: ”You
can lead a horse to water, but you can’t make
it drink”.
You can’t make a horse drink 
These findings highlight that the optimization
of investment decisions made by private
investors is to a large extent a demand side
problem, while regulators are currently
focusing on the supply side. 
In the U.S., a new agency called the Con  su  -
mer Finance Protection Agency was created
under the financial reform bill (i.e., the
Restoring American Financial Stability Act 
of 2010) to deal with mostly supply side prob-
lems. Likewise, the Markets in Financial
Instruments Directive (MiFID) implemented
in Europe aims to enhance protection of
retail investors by increasing the transparen-
cy of financial products. In the UK, the FSA
has even launched the Retail Distribution
Review (RDR) that, among others, suggests
minimizing conflicts of interest by prohibiting
commissions or defining minimum qualifica-
tion standards for financial advisors after
2012. Moreover, in Germany, the new
Securities Trading Act forces financial serv-
ices firms to disclose any fees – kickbacks,
bonuses, etc. – related to a (potential) prod-
uct sale. Yet, more information and disclo-
sure is only valuable if customers are able 
to translate these into better investment
decisions, which is found questionable by
this study. 
Our results apply not only to financial prod-
ucts, but also to patients’ adherence to med-
ical advice, which has been shown to be very
low. This is because patients believe they
know more than the doctor, are lacking
social support, or are simply unreasonable
about what they are told. It is up to future
research to identify the factors that prevent
investors from following beneficial financial
advice.
Experimenting with alternative ways to offer
advice is therefore a useful avenue to explore
in the future. For example, in our study, the
advice would require people to turn over
75% of their portfolios on average, since
investors’ existing portfolios are largely inef-
ficient. Investors in our sample may have
found it too complicated or too cumbersome
to implement the full list of recommenda-
tions, though they did turn over 70% of their
portfolios every year during the pre-advice
period. Therefore, making the implementa-
tion of the recommendations easier might
enhance the degree of following. 
Moreover, although the information given to
our advisees is extensive and clear, it may
not be much different from other less theo-
retically anchored sources of investment
advice, to which people might be exposed
outside the brokerage. Perhaps future set-
tings could therefore seek to build greater
trust with advisees. 
To conclude, much more needs to be done to
understand why and how financial advice is
actually followed and how it can help individ-
ual investors. Finally, the question remains:
What makes the horse drink?
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Figure 1: Unsystematic risk share in % of selected investors…
… had they followed
the advice
… who accepted to 
be adviced
… who did not accept 
to be adviced
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Insideview
Financial Supervision in the EU
INTERVIEW WITH DR. BERNHARD SPEYER, DEUTSCHE BANK RESEARCH
As a response to the financial crisis, the
European Commission proposed a reform of
the structure of financial supervision in the
European Union (EU). Since January 2011, the
newly formed European System of Financial
Supervision (ESFS) monitors financial stabil-
ity within the EU. Until last, Germany and the
United Kingdom favored national supervisory
authorities over the pan-European solution.
What are the benefits of a holistic European
system from your perspective?
There are two aspects to this: First, the inter-
twining of macro- and micro-prudential super-
vision under a common roof, the ESFS. This is
sensible, because only the combination of the
two can ensure financial stability. Having said
this, while this is conceptually evident, putting
into place an effective intertwining of both
types of supervision in day-to-day practice 
is difficult. But the framework established is
sound and will, for sure, grow into a holistic
approach over time. The second aspect is the
desirability of pan-European supervision: In a
single EU financial market with large cross-
border institutions, only an EU-level structure
can ensure effective supervision and financial
stability and will avoid competitive distortions.
How far is the current set-up away from a
truly holistic independent system? Where do
you see critical points limiting the success of
the current consent?
In the area of micro-prudential supervision, the
main weakness of the new set-up is that the
European Supervisory Agencies (ESAs) have
only very limited direct supervisory powers. To
what extent they will be able to gain weight vis-
à-vis national supervisors through setting rule-
books, peer review, arbitration and emergency
powers is an open question. As to macro-pru-
dential supervision, the European Systemic
Risk Board (ESRB), too, has only limited hard
power, but will have to exert influence by pro-
jecting “soft power”, i.e., through the quality of
its analysis and recommendations and by
means of communicating with the markets.
Does the ESFS, as it is designed and in oper-
ation, now reflect the right conclusions
drawn from the financial crisis?
Only partly. The ESRB clearly closes an identi-
fied gap in the supervisory structure. While its
structure appears a bit unwieldy, it will
nonetheless be a crucial element in preventing
financial imbalances, which may threaten
financial stability, from arising in the first
place. In contrast, the ESAs are clearly too
weak to really put the stability of Europe’s
financial markets on a firmer footing and to
deal more effectively with cross-border crises
compared to what we saw in the past couple of
years. I fear that too many policy-makers still
have not grasped that nation-based financial
supervision is ultimately not compatible with a
fully integrated financial market. Either we
move towards EU-level supervision or there
will be market re-fragmentation.
Does Deutsche Bank Research expect sig-
nificant changes to the banks’ business
model due to the implementation of the
ESFS?
No, it is not necessary to change entire busi-
ness models in reaction to the establishment
of the ESFS. But banks will need to monitor
closely, in particular, the actions of the ESRB.
Macro-prudential supervision, by definition,
affects banks irrespective of their own risk sit-
uation and may limit the growth of business
even if the bank itself had ample capital at its
disposal and a healthy asset base.  
How vocal and forceful do you expect the
ESRB to be?    
Initially, the ESRB will probably move cautious-
ly. Tools for macro-prudential supervision are
largely untested and in the current market envi-
ronment, the ESRB will want to avoid creating
further uncertainty. Also, experience must be
gained on how markets and authorities react to
ESRB warnings and recommendations.
Thank you for this interesting conversation. 
Dr. Bernhard Speyer
Deputy Head 
Deutsche Bank Research
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Honorary Membership in the Council of the E-Finance Lab
Jochen Partsch, acting mayor of the city of Darmstadt, accepts the honorable membership in the
Council of the E-Finance Lab. Mr. Partsch follows his predecessors, former Mayor Walther
Hoffmann, in encouraging the cooperation between the E-Finance Lab and the Technische
Universität Darmstadt. The E-Finance Lab gives Mr. Jochen Partsch a very warm welcome! 
Awards and Dissertations
Prof. Dr. Skiera’s and Nadia Abou Nabout’s paper is one of three finalists for the Gary L. Lilien
Practice Prize. The goal of the Gary L. Lilien Practice Prize is to highlight and celebrate outstanding
marketing science work that has had significant organizational impact. Among others, the price
committee includes colleagues from Harvard Business School, NYU, Duke and Dartmouth College.
The Alcatel-Lucent Foundation annually awards two dissertations in the field of "Communications
and Information Technology" with a price of € 5,000. For his dissertation thesis “Management and
Evolution of Global IS Outsourcing Relationships: A Longitudinal Case Study.” Dr. Robert W. Gregory
(formerly with layer 1) was one of the two laureates awarded by the foundation. The award ceremony
takes place in Stuttgart on October 7
th, 2011. Congratulations!
Dipl.-Wirtsch.-Inf. Martin Wolf (layer 1) has received his doctoral degree on August 1
st, 2011 with his
dissertation on “An Integrative Perspective on IT Innovation Assimilation in the Financial Services
Industry”. Congratulations!
Team Members
As a new member of the cooperative Ph.D. program Dipl.-Kffr. Sabine Fremdt joined the team of
layer 1 in July 2011. After completing her studies in business administration at the Justus-Liebig-
University in Giessen, Ms. Fremdt has started to work as a consultant in the Financial Services
division of IBM Global Business Services. Within the E-Finance Lab, Ms. Fremdt is supervised by
Prof. Dr. Roman Beck.
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In: Corporate Finance biz, pp. 24-37, 1/2011.
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In: Journal of Interactive Marketing, 25 (2011) 1,
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Schulze, C.; Bermes, M.; Skiera, B.:
A Simple Metric That Really Matters: A Pro  po  sal
To Include The Share Of Customer Business In
Financial Reporting.
In: Proceedings of the 40
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In: Proceedings of the 19
th European Confe  rence
on Information Systems, Helsinki, Finland, 2011.
Siebenhaar, M.; Lampe, U.; Lehrig, T.; Zöller, S.;
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In: Proceedings of the 4
th European Conference
ServiceWave, Poznan, Poland, 2011.
Weber, S.; Beck, R.; Pahlke, I.:
Measuring the Perceived Usefulness of Cor  po  -
rate Communication Technologies – An Empi  -
rical Study from a Bank in Singapore.
In: Proceedings of the 17
th Americas Confe  ren  ce
on Information Systems, Detroit, Michigan, USA,
2011.
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Companies use advanced technologies to understand and interact with customers, yet most still
depend on mass media marketing to drive impersonal transactions. To compete, companies must
shift from pushing individual products to long-term customer relationships building. The mar-
keting department must be reinvented as a “customer department” that replaces the CMO with a
chief customer officer, who makes product and brand managers subservient to customer man-
agers, and oversees customer-focused functions including R&D, customer service, market
research, and CRM. These changes shift the firm’s focus from product profitability to customer
profitability, as measured by metrics such as customer lifetime value and customer equity. This
organizational transformation will uproot entrenched interests and so must be driven from the top
management level.
Rust, R. T.; Moorman, C.; Bhall, G.
In: Harvard Business Review, 88 (2010) 1, pp. 94-101.
Infopool
RESEARCH PAPER: RETHINKING MARKETING
The E-Finance Lab conducts two kinds of newsletters which both appear 
quarterly so that each six weeks the audience is supplied by new research
results and information about research in progress. The focus of the printed
newsletter is the description of two research results on a managerial 
level – complemented by an editorial, an interview, and some short news.
For subscription, please send an e-mail to eflquarterly@efinancelab.com
or mail your business card with the note “please printed newsletter” to
Prof. Dr. Peter Gomber  
Vice Chairman of the E-Finance Lab
Goethe University
Grüneburgplatz 1 
60323 Frankfurt
The Internet-type newsletter uses short teaser texts complemented by 
hyperlinks to further information resources in the Internet. To subscribe,
please send an e-mail to
newsletter@efinancelab.com.
Further information about the E-Finance Lab is available at 
www.efinancelab.com.
Electronic newsletter
The relevance of stock market interruptions has experienced a major shift since the ongoing 
fragmentation and the increasing technological advancement of nowadays financial markets. The
authors investigate the interdependence between trading venues and the impact on the price 
discovery process before, during and after trading halts at the primary market. Revealing an
improvement in the price discovery process when trading migrates to alternative venues, this comes
at the cost of significant higher spreads and increasing volatility during the interruption. These
opposing effects have to been weighted carefully in terms of market quality and investor protection.
Chakrabarty, B.; Corwin, S.; Panayides, M.
In: Journal of Financial Intermediation, 20 (2011) 3, pp. 361-386.
RESEARCH PAPER: WHEN A HALT IS NOT A HALT: AN
ANALYSIS OF OFF-NYSE TRADING DURING NYSE
MARKET CLOSURES
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THE E-FINANCE LAB IS AN INDUSTRY-ACADEMIC RESEARCH PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN FRANKFURT AND DARMSTADT UNIVERSITIES AND PARTNERS DEUTSCHE BANK, DEUTSCHE BOERSE GROUP, DZ BANK GRUPPE,
FINANZ INFORMATIK, IBM, T-SYSTEMS, 360T, AND INTERACTIVE DATA MANAGED SOLUTIONS LOCATED AT THE HOUSE OF FINANCE, J. W. GOETHE UNIVERSITY, FRANKFURT.
The E-Finance Lab is a proud member of the House of Finance of Goethe University, Frankfurt. 
For more information about the House of Finance, please visit www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de.
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